As members of the human race we err, repeatedly and naturally; the trouble is that we humans tend to deny our own fallibility and our errors. As anaesthetists this tendency, aggravated by the high 'patient risk to human error' ratio of our daily work, and sadly enhanced by recent trends in litigation, leads us into difficulties.
In any field, analysis of errors provides a basis for designing effective corrective strategies,1.2 but when errors are concealed such studies are hindered. Common errors will thus continue to occur, mostly simple and harmless, but always a threat to the patient's safety, and just occasionally leading to patient harm. 2.3 Part of the purpose of monitoring is to recognise errors early, before patient harm has resulted. We need to monitor the anaesthetist, the equipment, and the monitors themselves, and to record any problems thus revealed. At the same time fellow anaesthetists need to be convinced that such data collection carries no threat, is both anonymous and confidential, and is a powerful tool for the improvement of our already high safety standards. 2 We should be seen to be leaders in the pursuit of clinical safety.
Human error accounts for the causes of at least 80% of all preventable anaesthesia incidents. 2 .4 Remembering that this is typical of other areas of human endeavour, 1.5 it is surprising that we remain so self-conscious about it. So-called 'equipment failure' makes up the bulk of the remaining causes. Equipment failure can include actual misuse (i.e. human error), and 'pure' equipment failurewhich is sometimes a euphemism for someone else's error (e.g. wall 9xygen or suction failure).
To date, in studying untoward anaesthetic events, we have classified them on the basis of outcome (e.g. morbidity or mortality).6.9 The value of such studies is unquestioned, both for sharpening our awareness of safety, and for the light of logic they help to shed upon areas of deficiency in our clinical practice. However, mortality is an insensitive detector of safety deficiencies and both mortality and morbidity studies carry a 'stable door' stigma. As Harrison has Anaesthesia and Intensive Care. Vol. 16. No. I. February. 1988 remarked, I 0 'Counting the dead is a crude method for gauging the quality of anaesthesia!' We need to redirect the focus of our studies towards preventive strategies;2 such strategies form the core of the 'critical incident' (Cl) technique for studying human error.
The Cl approach does not require death or injury (,substantive negative outcome')2 to identify errors. Rather, it utilises not just the small 'visible tip of mortality' of the metaphorical 'iceberg of clinical anaesthesia mistakes', ID but also samples the relatively large, and to date mostly untapped 'submerged body' of errors that do not cause patient harm.2.4 This 'iceberg' will always be there, because we are human. Further, even if its composition alters with changing techniques and practices, its analysis will continue to indicate the most effective likely corrective strategies. 2 What is more, the ongoing Cl technique permits the evaluation of these newly introduced corrective strategies.
Cl analysis is not new. Its introduction into the aviation psychology program of the United States' Army Air Force in 1941, I by Fianagan, resulted in a dramatic worldwide improvement in aviation safety, which continues today. I I In his original publication Flanagan acknowledges the contribution of the concepts of Sir Francis Galton in the late 19th century, and states 'The procedure (Cl analysis) was found very effective in obtaining information from individuals concerning their own errors, from subordinates concerning errors of their superiors, from supervisors with respect to their subordinates and also from participants with respect to their co-participants.' No doubt Fianagan in the 1940s functioned relatively free of litigation worries. Neither he, nor advocates of the Cl technique in anaesthesia, had or have the slightest interest in the culpability of individuals. The collection of error reports, however it may be done, is anonymous. 3 
.4
What exactly is a critical incident occurring during anaesthesia? The definition is precise: 1.3 any untoward event, or mishap -not necessarily harmful -occurring during the anaesthesia process (including the preoperative VISit and premedication responsibilities) which satisfies the following criteria: it is an error by a member of the anaesthesia team, or a failure of his equipment to function properly; it occurs while the patient is under the care of the anaesthesia team (including during recovery time); it is reported by someone either involved in, or who witnessed directly, the entire incident; it was clearly preventable. It should be noted that clinical events or complications which occur despite normal management, and which represent limitations of existing understanding in anaesthesia (e.g. patchy epidural block, anaphylaxis, etc.) are not at present Cls as defined in the above terms. However, the recording of such events, as part of a more broadly based incident reporting system, carries distinct advantages; these have been outlined elsewhere in this issue by Morgan.
The Cl technique was first applied to anaesthesia practice by Cooper et al. in 1975,3 and with the Validity unaffected by advances in anaesthesia.
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Evaluates new corrective strategies. establishment of a suitable anonymous reporting technique, it will operate continuously and unobtrusively in most departments. In fact, once the invariable initial resistance to it is overcome, the longer it runs (e.g. years) the more valid is the 'sampling'. Naturally, it is essential that there be continuing encouragement of department members to submit reports, to seek advice concerning the definition of particular incidents, and to attend the regular feedback sessions of results of on-going Cl studies. Based on this experience, a summary of some perceived advantages of the Cl technique is listed in Table 2 . The corrective strategy of using a disconnect alarm for the commonest Cl detected to date is now widely adopted. Clearly the technique cannot detect the total number of errors occurring in a department, relying as it does on voluntary reporting. It is a sampling technique, but is still valid, provided the sample is large enough (i.e. participation is adequate). As already mentioned, the technique will 'automatically' incorporate the newly recognised and expanding need in our practice to monitor the monitors. 12 In North Queensland a multi-city Cl study (centred in Townsville) is in progress, using a written questionnaire as the means of confidential reporting of critical incidents. An extension of these studies into the postoperative recovery rooms of Townsville hospitals is under trial. Several other current Australian and New Zealand institutional anaesthesia incident reporting studies are also known to the author. Howevet, a co-ordinated Australian and New Zealand incident reporting system for anaesthesia is now desirable. Computer technology is now at a stage which makes this possible. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author gratefully acknowledges the co-operation and trust of his Townsville anaesthesia colleagues in these studies.
